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Abstract 
Gerdau Group is a Brazilian enterprise that has undergone steady growth since its first acquisition in 
1948 of Riograndense steel mill. It has achieved a global position that is internationally recognized. This 
paper’s proposition of five hypotheses to explain the growth of the Gerdau Group is based on Penrose’s 
concept of growth and diversification, Guimarães’ concept of the internal restriction of growth, 
Chandler’s concept of strategy-structure, Dunning’s competitive advantages relative to the OLI 
paradigm and the Resource Base View model. The main results found were that the group is a capital 
unit in the process of growth. This growth is achieved mainly by means of horizontal integration. It also 
occurs by means of vertical integration. Most of the integration takes place within the original 
specialization area, the manufacturing of long steel products. The company recently started a process of 
diversification, expanded towards new markets, and new technological bases. Domestic growth 
occurred at a higher level than the domestic apparent demand, creating a bottleneck for future growth; 
thus, exports and FDI appeared as an outlet for the potential growth of the group. As a response to the 
strategy of growth, the group promoted structural changes, shifting from being a functional organization 
into becoming a multidivisional one, with increased decentralization but a global system of control 
developed internally was also present. The growth process was based on resources advantages that were 
internally created; mainly operational and financial processes constituted the ownership specific asset 
advantage. Such engendered sustainable advantages were due to its rare resource conditions and the 
challenge of any imitation. Foreign growth was mainly the result of market seeking, although it also 
occurred, to a lesser degree, by natural resources seeking, specific assets seeking and productive 
efficiency seeking, along with support and escape strategies. 
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Introduction 
It was a hot summer month in February 1948 when Waldomiro Schapke became manager of 
Riograndense steel mill, in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Schapke expected that the steel company 
would be instrumental in solving the wire rod supply problem that a nail factory he had been 
managing was having (Oliveira 1999). 
The Nail Factory Hugo Gerdau was then and still today one of the largest nail producers in the 
southern region (Baer 1970, 90). It was a metallurgical unit dependent on basic raw material: 
the wire rod that was transformed into nails by deafening machines blasting their syncopated 
pings and twangs. In the 1930s and 40s the wire rod domestic market had only two sources: the 
input purchases from Belgo Mineira, and imports (Gerdau 2001, 14). Under normal 
circumstances, provided no external accidents occurred, the Nail Factory was able to meet their 
supply utilizing either one of those two sources and maintain their cost structure under control. 
During difficult times, though, when WWI and WWII cut the international commercial lines, 
the enterprise was left with two options: either reduce production drastically, as it had done 
during WWI (Lannes 2006, 135), or acquire the wire rod from Belgo Mineira, the locus of more 
than a half the national steel production during the WWII (Baer 1970, 114). Schapke had 
experienced in both situations, first as factory employee and the second as a shareholder and 
manager. The Siderúrgica Riograndense economic deterioration came in handy, opening an 
opportunity horizon, the steel market, that was not restricted to tapping into the raw material 
supply by vertical integration. 
Neither Waldomiro Schapke nor Kurt Johannpeter, the Gerdau family representative in the nail 
factory, had ever imagined that the core business of the family enterprise would shift from the 
nail to the steel business, or that the Nail Factory Hugo Gerdau would eventually become the 
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Gerdau Group, today a steel conglomerate and the 18th greatest steel producer worldwide 
(World Steel Association 2017). It is their entrepreneurial history that shall be told and analyzed 
here. The first section is about theory and postulates five basic hypothesis of growth and 
internationalization; the second is a short methodological note; the third deals with the firm’s 
growth in the national market and the creation of the familiar group; the fourth deals with the 
process of the group’s internationalization; and the fifth brings the author’s final comments on 
the entrepreneurial experience presented. 
Theory and hypotheses 
Edith Penrose (2009, 104) established their theory of the growth of the firm through the 
diversification of activities, arguing that each firm has a particular technological base to serve 
different market areas, which is its current market. If the firm’s main objective is to grow, it 
must expand its sales revenue so that it can expand its productive capacity - which requires 
investment. The main important source of investment financing is profit reinvestment (Wood 
1975, 4). In modern capitalist models, profit is represented by the return on investment, which 
is the result of the difference between sales revenue and total costs, divided by net equity 
(Dunning 1993, 54). Hence, return on investment is positively related to sales revenue and 
negatively to costs.  
The continuous interaction of the technological base with current market leads to the 
accumulation of knowledge concerning the conditions of its supply vis-à-vis response to 
demand. The discrepancies between supply and demand lead the enterprise to innovate, 
generating a pool of cost and competitive strategies (Possas 1999, 69), so that the return on 
investment could, at least, not decrease. As strategy advantages are acquired, the firm can 
achieve profits - the essence of the process of valorization of capital (Macedo e Silva 1999, 45).  
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Thus, the firm in a capitalist economy is a unit of capital valorization, which grows in expanded 
reproduction. To do so, it requires two attributes: a general office with exclusive competencies 
to determine the firm’s organizational structure and its competitive and expansion strategies, 
and a level of profits that could lead to investment decision (Guimarães 1987, 14).  
Once stablished, the firm creates productive and administrative processes based on routines that 
gradually create skills and abilities, developing internally-generated capacities and 
competencies (Nelson and Winter 1982, 74).  Such competencies, in turn, could result not only 
in an ownership-specific advantage (Dunning 1988, 43) or a firm-specific advantage (Verbeke 
2011, 4), but also a sustainable and differential advantage (Barney 1991, 102; Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990, 4). Such strategies regarding the firm are designed for its technological base and 
its current market, together comprising the area of specialization of the firm, its core business. 
The area of specialization in turn affords the firm confidence to invest and, furthermore, shows 
the route to expansion, (Penrose 2009, 111). As the accumulation of capital is derived from 
investment and its return after acceptance of the firm’s strategies by the market, those 
characteristics of capital valorization reveal that the limits of growth derive from the limits of 
capital and market, as expressed as the capacity of the firm “to finance the required investment 
for its expansion and the existence of the market for its growing production” (Guimarães 1987, 
14).  
The growth in a particular area of specialization is restricted by the difference between two 
rates, the potential of growth of the firm and of the market. When the former is bigger than the 
later, the firm must find other market areas in which to expand, with the same technological 
base or with a new one. When the national market is restricted for expansion, the world market 
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become a natural outlet for the potential growth of the firm, such as exporting products or 
capital (Guimarães 1987, 150).  
As the firm grows because of its competitive, sustainable and differential advantages, the 
organizational structure must follow such growth, as well as the family culture embedded in 
such a changing environment. Growing by vertical and horizontal integration and by creating 
distribution channels requires the management of all these activities; thus, the firm is forced to 
make the “three-pronged investment” in production, selling and management (Chandler 1972, 
14; 1994, 8). On the other hand, to compete successfully the firm acquires the idiosyncratic 
ability to recombine internal and external resources as a result of the interaction among family 
members and the business; during a transgenerational family process, family members acquire 
a deep level of firm-specific tacit knowledge when working in the business and living among 
the family from an early age (Chirico and Nordqvist 2010, 4), which contributes to generate 
stronger institutional values, according to the interrelations between firm, property rights and 
management (Esparza Aguilar, Pérez de Lema and Gómez Guillamón 2010, 14).  
To invest abroad, the firm must have some advantages, such as the Dunning’s OLI (ownership, 
location, and internalization) or Verbeke’s definition of firm-specific advantage (FSA), 
internationally transferable or non-transferable (Verbeke 2011, 4).  It is further important to 
have some strategic objectives (market, resource, efficiency and strategic asset seeking, escape, 
support and passive investment)1, and phases of internationalization (from export to direct 
foreign investment), which characterizes the path of growth in foreign markets (Dunning 1980, 
                                                          
1 Even though Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula, and Un (2015, 25-35) proposed another set of motives – sell more, buy 
better, upgrade and escape –, the author maintain the original Dunning’s motives, because if we have to change 
ideas due the change in the world and consolidate all the Dunning’s motives into four kinds of motives we can 
consolidate them into only two motives, derived from the essential equation Dunning recalled as the main reason 
of entrepreneurs’ decisions, that is, to augment the rate of return. The Dunning’s proposition (1993, 56-63) helps 
us in disaggregating the firm pool of strategies to analyzed them. 
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9-11; 1993, 56-63; 2000, 163-165). The growth process can be done by construction of new 
productive units, or acquisition of an existing enterprise, or merger with a competitor or a joint-
venture with a partner in specific markets or with a specific purpose (Penrose 2009, 143; 
Mangum, Kim, and Tallman 1996, 16).  
When abroad, with all acquisitions as subsidiaries, the headquarters could ensure, for each 
foreign unit, a good deal of freedom to take strategic decision. This is a subsidiary mandate that 
guarantees (or not) initiatives from the subsidiaries (Birkinshaw 1996, 471; 1997, 207).  
Since the firm-specific advantages, motives, phases, form and subsidiary governance are not 
predicted, we only can observe them ex post, because of the uncertainty economic dynamic and 
the existence of randomly events. 
From such extant theories, we have constructed five hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: growth of the firm derives mainly from its area of specialization due to the 
interaction between its technological base and its current market; 
Hypothesis 2: growth of the firm occurs in foreign markets when the firm’s growth rate is higher 
than the growth rate of the domestic market; 
Hypothesis 3: growth of the firm changes its organizational structure and its values; 
Hypothesis 4: internationalization based on barely differentiable product is the result of 
operational advantages internally created; 
Hypothesis 5: internationalization based on barely differentiable product is manly market 
seeking. 
Business history and sources 
This paper is a historical microanalysis of a capitalist enterprise in its social economic context 
(Kula 1974, 139), that is, a business history of an individual firm (Barbero 2003, 318) with a 
 
Volume 3, Number 2, 118-150, July-December 2018                   doi:10.1344/jesb2018.2.j049  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
124 
limited scope based on the theoretical approach discussed in the previous section. It is based on 
Gerdau’s institutional history (Gerdau 2001), from which it ispossible to extract relevant data 
about several aspects of Gerdau’s temporal evolution. 
We have selected the following unit of analysis (and its variables): technological base 
(productive technologies), the current market (pool of market areas), the growth process by 
horizontal and vertical integration (acquisition, merger, backward and forward integration), 
financial strategy (borrowing, stock market, relations with bankers), organizational 
restructuring process (organization structure) and subsidiaries mandates (mandate gain, 
mandate development, mandate loss), institutional values (family creeds), innovative and 
quality strategies (product specification, durability, line of products, brand, commercial 
channels), and the relation between the firm and state-owned institutions (fund searching). 
The recent temporal evolution is based on the published reports, especially the Annual Report 
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Form 20-F. Specific historical aspects, 
such as the evolution of financial strategy, national expansion and internationalization, are 
documented by means of two interviews conducted with key employees. Three other interviews 
available in the company’s Documentation Center, were also utilized. The balance sheets 
submitted since 1969 to the Security and Exchange Commission of Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro 
were used as a source for the financial and production data. Finally, some data for the enterprise 
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The growth of Gerdau Group in the Brazilian domestic market 
The Riograndense steel mill in Porto Alegre, one of the smallest steel factories in Brazil in the 
forties (Baer 1970, 90), was a minimill2. Its technological base in that period was composed of 
a electric furnace for scrap fusion and a conventional casting and rolling system.  Both systems 
were operated manually. Its technological dependency was related to the geographic location 
of scrap. The location of raw material supplies determined where the factory would be located. 
Riograndense Steel Mill’s current market was thus the mechanical, construction and farming 
industries. These markets were the targets of its main products, such as bars, rebars and wires. 
The Nail Factory Hugo Gerdau acquired the steel mill in 1948, with funds from the enterprise, 
the Gerdau family itself and from loans (Gerdau 2001, 14). After the acquisition, one of the 
first measures taken was to adjust the factory to build a profitable cost structure (Oliveira 1999). 
The factory operated at a technological lag. The steel mill processed 3 tons per charge from the 
electric furnace, 11 thousand tons of raw steel/year using a 3-megawatts electric transformer 
(Gerdau 2001, 19) when furnaces and electric transformers with fivefold capacity had been 
available since the beginning of the twentieth century (Madias 2014, 271). Conventional 
casting, with liquid steel pouring into molds and subsequently demolded, and the rolling 
system, followed the technological parameters of this period. However, the main problem of 
the steel mill was the operational process, which was resolved by closing the factory for six 
months (Oliveira 1999). The need for wire rod supply for the manufacturing of nail had to wait 
for a medium-term solution - the installation of a drawing mill - in the early fifties. The technical 
                                                          
2 Technology of steel production based on electric furnace, using mainly scrap as raw material; it is differentiated 
from the integrated steelmaking, with a larger productive scale, dependent on iron ore and situated near mineral 
deposits, while the minimill, with smaller productive scale, can be localized in several regions of the territory 
where water, electric energy and scrap are available. 
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improvement, however, created two new bottlenecks for the enterprise that led to an unbalanced 
growth cycle: on the one hand, the electrical infrastructure did not support modernization and 
factory growth; on the other hand, the rolling mill capacity was greater than the steel mill, 
creating unbalanced input flow and machinery idleness. The solution was the construction of a 
steel greenhouse (Gerdau 2001, 23). 
Between 1955 and 1957, Riograndense 2nd was build. It stood 30km from Riograndense 1st in 
the city of Sapucaia do Sul. For six years, it was possible to construct a minimill with a more 
modern steel mill, a continuous casting and a much more modern rolling mill (Gerdau 2001, 
24-6). The electric furnace was capable of producing five tons per charge, producing 18 
thousand tons annually. Despite that, it was not able to exploit the scale economy already 
existing in the industry capable of producing twice that capacity (Walden and Marincek 1957, 
56). The rolling mill was a tandem type, which meant that it had a continuous cold rolling. The 
gains in productivity and quality were only achieved, however, by substituting the continuous 
casting with the conventional one. This was considered an early adoption of this technical 
progress, since the fact that back in the sixties, this system only accounted for three percent of 
the global rolling process (Palacio Reparaz and Arana Bilbao 2002, 118). This new mill created 
an unprecedented experience of a greenhouse steel mill construction, that embedded a singular 
characteristic of the group central board: the implementation of the best technologies and 
methods. This factory mill would still receive the investment capable of five times the steel 
production that, added to the Farrapos mill production, favored the enterprise to overcome the 
level of 100 thousand tons produced in 1967 (Vieira 2007, 339). 
After one and a half decades of steel mill operation under new management, the enterprise 
advanced its expertise in the area of specialization of long steel with state of art technology in 
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Sapucaia mill and in the obsolete factory in Farrapos. This approach characterized technological 
heterogeneity for which the company would develop an adequate management system in the 
future. 
The growth of the Riograndense mill that took place over the course of a decade and a half 
under the control of the Gerdau family was concentrated regionally in the southern part of the 
country, although the firm possessed distribution centers in the northern, northeastern and 
southeastern regions of the country (Rosenfeld 1999). The second half of the fifties was the 
period that saw a national growth spurt in infrastructure and industrialization due to Brazilian 
president Kubitschek’s “Target Plan”, which concentrated the national economic dynamics in 
the southeastern region of the country (Lessa 1982, 27; Cano 1983, 227). At the same time, the 
economy in the Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul saw a reduction in growth with the end of 
capital accumulation based on small enterprise under the new framework of integration of the 
national market (Herrlein Jr 2002, 653). For the company, the strategy of growth meant the 
achievement of productive units in larger markets, be it by greenhouse or acquisition. The 
business opportunity in these markets appeared randomly. 
The mini-mill technology base was instrumental in accessing local markets employing small 
productive units and utilizing the local supply of scrap. This approach allowed for the reduction 
of production costs related to a large-scale production unit by utilizing local scrap collection as 
opposed to transporting scrap from all around the country. 
From 1967 on, the Brazilian economy grew rapidly, following the global trend, with the aid of 
the development plans of the civil-military dictatorship. This cycle extended until the early 
seventies, when the oil crisis exacerbated the domestic crisis (Bresser Pereira 1984, 219). The 
2nd National Development Plan announced in 1974 would maintain the national economy in 
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“forced march” (Castro 2004, 30). Major infrastructure works were in process, such as the 
hydroelectric power plant of Itaipu (1975-1982), São Paulo subway system (1968-1975), the 
first line), the Rio-Niteroi bridge (1969-1975), among others. This would expand the market 
for long steel in the Brazilian economic center (Vargas 1994, 178). In this context, in five years, 
the company acquired three industrial mills in smaller regional markets in the northeastern and 
in the southern areas of the country.  A larger scale steel mill, the Guanabara steel company 
(Cosigua), capable of producing 250 thousand tons annually was built between 1971 and 1974, 
in the national economic center of the time, Rio de Janeiro. That was ten times the output of the 
Sapucaia factory. The first successful attempt at stablishing a joint enterprise for the business 
was achieved with an association with the German Thyssen, who brought the credit for 
financing the project. During this expansion period towards the Brazilian economic center, the 
fourth generation of Gerdau-Johannpeter family fully entered the steel business; construction 
of the greenhouse of Cosigua was a formative learning experience for the four brothers that 
would be at the helm of the enterprise growth until the end of the century. By then, the company 
had already become a group, the Gerdau Group (Gerdau 2001, 42-66). 
During the eighties, when the Brazilian economy stagnated, the privatization of the national 
steel industry followed the international trend of privatizations. This opened opportunities of 
growth for the group that extended for the nighties. The group faced great competitors, such as 
Nippon Steel and Arcelor (Paula 1997, 94; Crosseti and Fernandes 2005, 157n). It took 
advantage of privatization, enlarging its horizontal integration to consolidate its regional market 
share in the northeast and south, expanding its market share in the southeast. Gerdau’s current 
market was still increased within its area of specialization, long steel products, achieving the 
production level of two million tons by the late eighties (Gerdau 2001, 171-187). The great shift 
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arrived with technological diversification: when Gerdau entered the market of special and flat 
steel. 
The acquisition of Piratini Fine Steel, in 1992, in the southern region, marked the company’s 
entry into the reduced market of special steel (Gerdau 2001, 188). Such a steel factory was 
somewhat technologically different, due to the inclusion of ladle refining in the steel mill. This 
difference determined the dependency on new inputs, such as metal alloys, and a more specific 
workforce with experience in ladle metallurgy. But the great jump was Gerdau’s entry into the 
flat steel market, with the long and laborious acquisition of Açominas. This process lasted six 
years. In 2003 Açominas was finally integrated into the group (Gerdau 2001, 176; Gerdau 
2003c, 10). However, in this case, the technological diversification was total, due to the shift to 
other steel productive routes, the integrated steel mill, with a blast furnace, basic oxygen 
furnace, casting and rolling slabs and rolled coil. Such technology determined new 
dependencies on inputs, such as iron ore, coke and limestone (Palacio Raparaz and Arana 
Bilbao 2002, 39). 
In the late nineties, after achieving the global production level of five million tons of crude steel 
(Vieira 2007, 339), the Group’s growth in the national market was almost none, with the 
exception of the acquisition of Villares Steel, and the horizontal and vertical integration in the 
integrated steel sector. Villares was a major special steel producer in Brazil. It was indirectly 
acquired when its owner, the Spanish Sidenor, was purchased (Lannes 2013, 19). In 2000, 
Gerdau Group was responsible for half the national production of long steel, its core business. 
It was about to monopolize the domestic special steel market and it started to take on the 
competition in the national flat steel market, which was 70% bigger than the long steel market 
(Gerdau 2000b, 17; WSA 2002, 54-55). Because of such a great amount of market share, 
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Gerdau started to face legal impediments to growth issued by the Administrative Council for 
Economic Defense (CADE) in 1995 (Pinho 1995, 28), leading the group to escape investment 
related to long steel market areas domestically. 
With such growth achieved by horizontal integration, the Group felt the pressure of low cash-
flow and gradually higher costs. From 1967 to 1970, when the national economy grew 10% per 
year, the Group’s steel production grew at the annual rate of 30% and its current assets at a 
yearly rate of 13% (PIB, Gerdau 1969-1970), thus creating the need for a larger amount of 
working capital and current liquidity; for this reason and in order to meet the increased demand 
due to the “economic miracle” euphoria, guaranteed sales were needed. The Group then created 
its merchant channel, Commercial Gerdau, a distribution network gradually dispersed across 
the larger regional center where steel consumers were concentrated. In the beginning, it also 
served the role of scrap buyer. In the eighties, with more mills in operation, the Group invested 
in downstream operation of construction products ready for use, adding value to the main 
product, but compensated to the client for the productivity gains in construction.  In 1989, the 
Group created the Steel Cutting and Folding Service Centers (Armafer) (Gerdau 2001, 80, 255), 
a new market area by reinforcing forward integration. 
On the other hand, the enterprise’s national accelerated growth during the seventies, when its 
production grew by a factor of six (Vieira 2007, 339), made it vital to think about cost, mainly 
goods direct costs, including the cost of electric energy and raw materials. In the early seventies, 
the Brazilian energy matrix had only 18% of electricity, while wood and vegetable coal 
accounted for 32%, and 38% by oil (Pinto 1990, 77). Foreseeing the possibility of energy 
shortage, the group created a reforestation enterprise, in 1971. In the next decade they began to 
produce wood. The scrap was the fundamental raw material of its technological base and was 
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already scarce in the southern region of the country, when the group decided to accelerate its 
growth in the seventies. At the end of this decade, such scarcity caused the enterprise to have 
to be supplied with pig iron, a dearer raw material (Vieira 2007, 91). It was necessary to seek 
out other regional scrap sources, so, in 1980, the group created Scrap Gerdau to collect and 
process scrap, replacing Commercial Gerdau’s outsourcing. This processing is a fundamental 
requisite for liquid steel quality. When Açominas was acquired, the group decided to acquire 
in the 2000’s a pig iron producer in the northeast of the country, since its technological base 
required the iron ore and pig iron as raw material. Gerdau went on to purchase iron ore reserves 
in the southeast, whose exploration in the 2010 exceeded the firm’s necessity. Gerdau then 
began to sell the surplus on the marketplace (Gerdau 2003c, 2; 2007c, 5; 2009c, 6; 2011c, 5). 
The vertical integration caused the group to conglomerate, enlarging the technological 
heterogeneity and imposed more quantity of financial resources. 
The group could rely on the financial expertise of its president, the entrepreneur and original 
member of the Gerdau group, Kurt Johannpeter, also a former auditor of Deutsch Überseeische 
Bank in Latin America, from the 1920s through the 1940s. He took over the family business, 
by way of marrying Helda Gerdau – the third-generation member of Gerdau family and owner 
of one third of the nail factory – and by the bank closure after the World War II. The acquisition 
of Riograndense steel and the greenhouse construction of Sapucaia factory required a 
considerable amount of financial resources drawn from their own funds and loans at market 
interest rate. To reduce financial cost, the group decided to participate in the stock market in 
the early sixties, when it launched its IPO (Gerdau 2001, 85). At the same time, the group 
prepared to access international resources, and to achieve this it gathered the best minds 
available on the market. This is the Gerdau way of innovating. From 1977 to 1981, as financial 
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director, and from 1982 to 1990, as financial advisor, the group hired a financial executive with 
extensive experience in the financial area. He served as president of two development banks: 
BRDE and Badesul. He was also a former Central Bank director, whose job inside Gerdau was 
to introduce the group to international financial centers, in Europe and United States (Burguer 
2006; CRP 2012). The group conglomeration went into the financial market in the nineties, 
with the creation of Gerdau Bank.  It served the purpose of centralizing the group’s current 
assets financial operations – credit to customers in trade accounts receivable – and current 
liabilities – credit from outsourcers in trade accounts payable. With its internationalization, the 
search for cheaper resources to finance its foreign growth brought the group to the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1999, and to Europe, via Madrid Stock Exchange in 2002 (Gerdau 2001, 
209; 2002c, 6). 
The growth strategy that propelled a single steel mill in Porto Alegre to become a vertical 
integrated steel conglomerate required a structural change. For two and half decades, the group 
possessed a centralized management structure, run by executive committee where the Gerdau-
Johannpeter family members and hired executives participated. During the 1970s expansion, 
new legislation concerning stock corporations was passed – Law 6404, of December 15, 1976, 
which made it obligatory for the company to have a management committee with deliberative 
attributions. It also imposed the separation of the strategic management and the executive 
management. These, growth and law, pushed for a more decentralized organization, more 
regionalized and more concentrated on the productive apparatus. To that end, the group 
established several boards: a) the administrative board for the strategy functions and pertinent 
deliberations, b) the board of directors that would perform operational work and be responsible 
for the three regional centers – south, southeast and northeast – and c) the management of 
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factory and commercial units, each unit possessing its own management structure:  production, 
commercial, finance-accountability-control, Human Resources. Each of these units had its own 
intermediate-level manager (Gerdau 2001, 96). Such structure was later kept maintained only 
at higher-level management: the administrative board and the board of directors. The 
organization structure below this level changed over time as a result of growth dynamics. 
Table 1. Gerdau assets steel plants and other units from 1901 to 2010 
Year Company Region 
Form of 
investmet 
1901 Fábrica de Pregos Ponta de Paris South A 
1948 Siderúrgica Riograndense South A 
1957 Usina Riograndense II South G 
1969 Siderúrgica Açonorte Northeast A 
1971 
Comercial Gerdau Southeast G 
Siderúrgica Cosigua Southeast JV - A 
1972 Laminação Guaíra South A - D 
1974 Siderúrgica Alagoas Northeast A 
1981 
Metálicos Southeast G 
Siderúrgica Cearense Northeast G 
1983 Usina Guaíra South G 
1985  Siderúrgica Hime Southeast A 
1986 Usina Siderúrgica Paraense Southeast A 
1986 Cia. Brasileira de Ferro Southeast A 
1988 Siderúrgica Barão de Cocais Southeast A 
1989 Siderúrgica Usiba Northeast A 
1991 Cosinor Northeast A 
1992 Aços Finos Piratini South A 
1994 
Siderúrgica Pains Southeast A 
Laminadora São José dos Campos Southeast A 
1997-2001 Açominas Southeast A 
2003 
Maranhão Gusa S.A. Northeast A 
Reservas minerais Southeast A 
2005-2006 Usina São Paulo Southeast G 
2009 Maco Metalúrgica Southeast A 
Abbreviations:  
Forms of investment: A-Acquisition; G-Greenfield; JV-Joint venture; M-Merger 
Sources: Gerdau 2001, 2001a-2010a; compiled by the author 
The conglomeration enlargement in the eighties changed the management organization; the 
emphasis on the productive units, that is, in the operational processes, was modified by an 
emphasis on the market, that is, focusing on sales channels, because of the group’s capacity to 
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segment its customers. Business units were created for each of eight commercialization areas: 
construction, industry, farming, nails, metallurgical products, special steel, export and 
distribution (Pinho 1995, 32). The business units in this period constituted the main source of 
the capital valorization process by direct contact with the demand in each market area. The 
market would signal to the productive and support units what, how much, and when each type 
of product must be produced. 
The group made a 180-degree change in its competition strategy during the 1980s. This 
approach was the result of a slow innovative process, originally planned in product and finally 
in processes, acquiring the best available knowledge in the market. In the sixties, when the 
group started to expand nationally, the technological heterogeneity of factory units brought 
operational problems that led the group to create an internal section of operational engineering 
to search for solutions for technological and processes problems, from the intermediate 
management level to the productive floor. The first knowhow import was the hire of retired 
North-American engineers specialized in the steel mill to resolve operational problems. From 
this interaction, a training program was created in the seventies, the Gerdau Engineering Section 
(SEG). Its goal was to analyze manufacturing problems and develop its own technological 
knowledge and diffuse it among the productive units. The next knowhow import was the 
association with Japanese steel enterprises – Funabashi Steel and Nippon Steel – specialized in 
minimill technology; from such partnership arose the concern about productive and process 
quality. This culminated in the consequent inner implementation, although slowly, of the PDCA 
methodology, which encompassed even the factory floor, creating service cells (Santos 2001; 
Sommer 2006). Over three decades, the group developed its own operational management 
capacity, which constituted an ownership asset advantage or a transferable FSA (Lannes 2008, 
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387). This series of techniques allowed the group to manage the technological and process 
diversity of its production units. At each horizontal expansion by acquisition, the group 
internalized yet another management system inherited from each steel mill it had acquired. It 
was out of necessity for a uniformity pattern and the need for the continuity of quality 
management that the group created the management process, from which emerged a more 
unified management system in years 2000: the Gerdau Business System (GBS), which “capture, 
consolidate, and diffuse the enterprise best practices in its processes” (Gerdau 2013a, 13). For 
the foreign units, the headquarters were able to ensure some growing degree of liberty in the 
subsidiary mandate, as the GBS provide the parameters to be reached by such units. 
During the group growth, the family members that were part of management instilled values 
that led the firm strategies; such values were established by the chief executive, Kurt 
Johannpeter, over the three and half decades of his term at the company’s helm. In 1986, after 
his death, the values Johannpeter handed down were institutionalized as Gerdau Creeds: 
“sincerity and plain dealing with everybody, profit as the measure of performance, secure 
growth on a sound basis, and people as the basis for business efficiency”. In 1998, new values 
were added: “outstanding quality products and services; satisfied customers; and self-
fulfillment” (Gerdau 2001, 234).  This company culture brought both advantages and 
disadvantages to the group. Safety and soundness were a hallmark of the group’s financial 
performance, causing it to become more indebted during the period of high expansion, returning 
to its original level of 40%, when expansion was decelerated (Gerdau 1969-2010a). On the 
other hand, the nature of company’s relationship with the workforce was mediated by its 
concept of people: the value of profit as the measure of performance is the result of people’s 
efficiency, the group inner public, who rely on improved working conditions, stimulus and 
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support to their families. This support requires the company to supply services and assistance 
to employees and their families in areas such as health, housing, food, transport, education, 
sport, and leisure (Gerdau 2001, 88). In order to achieve higher efficiency on their employees’ 
part, the company, inspired by its own values, took it upon itself to provide them with public 
services. These employees are not seen as mere members of their workforce, but as 
collaborators. As a result, the struggle between capital and labor does not exist in these 
institutional values. Therefore, it has been difficult for the Group to understand the Trade 
Union, the claim that capital and labor do not cooperate, that the union has to monitor labor 
practices and their remuneration, which includes the existence of union organization inside 
factories. The clash between company and union cultures led to the outbreak of a workers’ 
movement inside several factories that culminated in the creation of a global workers 
association, originally called Workers of the Gerdau Group, in 1998, which ultimately became 
the Gerdau Workers’ World Council, created in Porto Alegre in 2006 (Gray 2009, 85, 124). 
Such national growth was bolstered in part by support by the State. Whether creating demand, 
or by supplying credit, the Federal government has always directly influenced the steel industry 
as a whole and the group in particular. The two great jumps in growth, which involved not the 
acquisition of rival companies, but the greenhouse construction of new factories, was partially 
funded by National Bank for Economic Development, the public long-term investment bank 
created in 1952, during President Getúlio Vargas term (Gerdau 2001, 26, 47). Investment in 
Brazilian infrastructure, derived mainly from the 2nd National Development Plan (II PND), was 
heavily invested in hydroelectric power (Batista 1987, 70). This policy secured effective 
demand for the steel industry, from which the group was benefited, supplying steel not only for 
 
Volume 3, Number 2, 118-150, July-December 2018                   doi:10.1344/jesb2018.2.j049  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
137 
the Itaipu power plant, but also for the construction of São Paulo subway system and the 
construction of the Rio-Niteroi bridge. 
The internationalization of Gerdau Group 
Before exhausting the possibility of expansion in the national market, the group started seeking 
markets abroad, for overcome to operate with overcapacity. In the seventies, it started to export 
goods, the first step in internationalization. The second step would be export capital in the form 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since it was a completely new territory for the firm it would 
require a previous knowledge, so that the group could acquire the capacity to conquer another 
dynamic center, the United States’ economy, the second major steel demand in that moment 
(World Steel Association 1982, 36). The predominant form of FDI in foreign factories accounts 
for 37 acquisitions, and eight joint-ventures, one of which by greenhouse construction, three by 
merger and one as shareholder (Table 2; Lannes 2014, 148-149). 
Such foreign expansion was broken down into three phases. The learning phase, which lasted 
for a decade, lasted from the beginning of the eighties to the beginning of nineties, when the 
group acquired assets in Uruguay and Canada. The second phase comprised the start and 
consolidation of the entry in the American markets, which peaked with the entry into both the 
United States’ steel market, and the Latin American markets. The third phase was the recent 
expansion outside America continent, impaired by the 2008 economic crisis. 
The group had the perspective of its own capital internationalization since the beginning of its 
own goods’ exports, with the Uruguay being one foreign market for its ingots. In 1980, when 
the commercial branch learned of a client’s intention to sell its factory, Laisa Steel, they 
acquired it. It proved to be an asset that came in handy. Being located in Uruguay, this factory 
was closer to the company’s headquarters in Porto Alegre than it was to the Brazilian economic 
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center. It fully fit in the group’s plan to experiment on how to act in foreign environments, 
because of idiom, customs, labour relations, and so on; simply put, due to the broader conditions 
that the foreign world presented (Gerdau 2001, 164-165).  
Since the group needed to learn, the management of the acquired firm was completely 
controlled by the headquarters, a center-controlled mandate. It was a micro steel factory, with 
a seven thousand tons of steel production capacity, run annually by an obsolete technology. The 
former capacities acquired by the group: technical reforms, technological modernization and 
goods improved were transferred to this first FDI, seeking for the results with this experiment, 
characterizing internationally transferable FSAs that would create another FSA that would also 
be transferable later. This highly educational experience shaped the executives who would be 
involved in the acquisition of a Canadian steel factory, an entry gate for the North American 
market3. 
The second FDI was the acquisition of Courtice Steel, in 1989, almost a decade since the 
Uruguayan experience (Gerdau 2001, 159). The group advanced its own learning process, since 
it would operate a workforce with a different language and culture from their headquarters in 
Brazil. From there they would deal with the correction of operational management and control 
labour conflicts derived from union pressure. The group started a shift in the governance 
pattern, maintaining the original executives in their management places, including the former 
CEO, who would share the management with Brazilian executives who had trained in Uruguay 
and new executives who would start their own learning experience in a new context. Among 
such beginners were fifth generation members of the Gerdau family, which would eventually 
run the group. A major mandate liberty was secured by the parent firm. 
                                                          
3 So, this FDI had not a market seeking objective, since the Uruguayan market was already supplied by Gerdau’s 
export, as expressed by Barbosa (2004, 98). 
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I characterize such a phase as a learning phase, since it was during this period that Brazilian 
executives learned different styles of management of the already known technological base and 
established a relationship with distinct workforce, managing cultural and union conflicts, more 
than merely seeking market; it is more appropriately characterized as strategic-asset seeking, 
especially in Canada, sharing capabilities with native employees4. 
When the Group acquires assets in South America and Canada in the early nineties, Gerdau had 
a great steel market at its disposal. The apparent use of crude steel in America in 1990 was 143 
million tons and it was estimated that nearly 37% was the long steel demand. Gerdau would 
reach a production level of 2.4 million tons that year (WSA 1993, 54; 1998, 78-79; Vieira 2007, 
339). The long steel market in North America was seventeen times of the company’s 
production; South America’s was five times bigger. By the end of the century, the group would 
expand strongly into these two geographical areas, focusing its expansion in the United States’ 
economy, since its biggest market in the Americas would allow for a greater diversity in the 
forms of growth. 
The Latin American expansion coincided with the strong growth of the regional apparent steel 
demand since the late eighties. The demand jumped from 15 million tons in 1989 to 35.7 million 
tons in 2000 (WSA 1991, 41; 2001, 85), more than doubling in size in one decade. The group 
succeeded in entering in three South American economies with a market share above 15% 
before its great global competitors: Chile, Colombia and Peru. In the other economies, 
Argentina, México and Venezuela, that had an apparent annual steel demand level above three 
million tons, the entry was marginal. The market share in those markets did not surpass five 
                                                          
4 As opposed in part to Barbosa (2004, 99), which emphasized only the market seeking objective. 
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percent, since its global competitors came in early into these markets (Azpiazu, Basualdo, and 
Kufas 2005, 100; Soto Flores and Solé Parrellada 2001, 100; Giacalone 2008, 14). 
When seeking markets in Latin America, the group took the same mini-mill technological route, 
that is, to produce long steel, maintaining its growth inside its historical specialization area. 
Such condition would change with the entry in the United States steel market. Because of the 
size of its market, the possibility of diversification to other technological bases and other market 
areas became reality. 
Before this event, a fortuitous experience caused the group to ingress in a new market area and 
bring to the company a totally new system of governance, characterizing this FDI as specific-
asset investment, not sought. Manitoba Rolling Mills (MRM) was a Canadian mini-mill in a 
market niche of long steel for the rail industry, agricultural machinery and elevator guides. The 
group was unaware of the existence of MRM up to this point. It was a medium scale factory, 
modern, with good financial indicators. Despite that, its executives did not see how competition 
could be faced without the support of a great steel group; thus, in 1995 MRM executives 
reached out to Gerdau with a proposal that their assets be acquired by the group. Gerdau 
incorporated yet one more management system and, since MRM produced such positive 
outcomes, the group granted plain mandatory to local managers. The group would deal simply 
with the human resources interchange for the system integration with the headquarters system 
(Gerdau 2001, 201; Sommer, 2006). With this plain mandate, Gerdau MRM was established in 
1995 and in 2000 entered into two joint ventures for market niches, the trailer I rebar and guide 
elevators (Gerdau 2002b, 49)5. 
                                                          
5 Again, it is opposed to that quoted by Barbosa (2004, 100) because, rather than a merely market seeking, MRM 
was a learning school for new form of governance, which, consequently, brought a new market niche. 
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In 1999, the group finally entered the United States steel market, with the acquisition of the 
third biggest long steel producer, Ameristeel, which consisted of four steel factories and 
eighteen service centers for cutting and bending bars. This acquisition put to the test the group’s 
expertise in financing its own acquisition: 88% of loans in a medium term (Lannes 2005, 358). 
Three years later, another fortuitous fact: the fourth biggest Canadian steel producer and the 
first in mini-mill route, Co-Steel, proposed a merger to the group, which increased its Canadian 
steel market share two and a half times, from 8,2% to 21,4%, only with stock exchange (Gerdau 
2003b, 7; Lannes 2014, 157). From this point on, the group grew in the United States, acquiring 
two of the three biggest long steel producers, North Star in 2004 and Chaparral Steel in 2007 
in addition to other smaller steel producers, consolidating itself as the second biggest long steel 
producer in this country6. Chaparral’s acquisition showed the Gerdau’s financial expertise, 
another internationally transferable FSA: 7% of this investment was cash (Susin 2009, 56). In 
2007, the Group acquired the second biggest special steel producer, excluding stainless steel, 
the MacSteel. From 2004 to 2008, it expanded its secondary steel processing in the center of 
the United States by acquiring six services centers. In the same period, it reinforced its scrap 
supply by acquiring two recycling units in United States and one in Canada. As the group 
acquired new factories in long and special steel production, it extended itself vertically to unsure 
enough demand and raw material supply, a support investment. The conquest of the western 
market was achieved by means of the acquisition of Pacific Coast Steel, a supplier of steel 
structures for infrastructure constructors (Gerdau 2014a, 19; Lannes 2014, 158). Over the span 
of one decade, the Gerdau Group stablished itself in the United States steel industry, with a 
strong presence in the long and special steel markets, by horizontal and vertical integration. 
                                                          
6 With 15% of the raw steel capacity in the long steel industry sector, Nucor accounted 20% in 1996, according to 
Hall (1997, 367-375) data. 
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North American operations reached the maximum group total production level of 46% in 2005, 
the year when all foreign operations reached half of group total production. Out of the 29 
million tons of long steel total produced in North America in this year, the group was 
responsible for a fifth of that: 6 million tons. The Gerdau Group became then one of the most 
internationalized enterprise in Brazil (WSA 2008, 42; Gerdau 2005c, 1; KPMG 2008, 12). 
Table 2. Gerdau main FDI in steel plants and other units from 1980 to 2016 
Year Company Country Technological route Form of investment 
1980 Laisa Uruguay EAF/R A 
1989 Courtice Canada EAF/R A 
1992 Indac/Aza Chile EAF/R A 
1995 
Manitoba Rolling Mill Canada EAF/R A 
Bradley Steel Canada - JV 
1997 Sipsa Argentina R A 
1998 Sipar Argentina R P 
1999 Ameristeel United States EAF/R A 
2000 SSS/MRM Canada - JV 
2001 Birmingham United States EAF/R A 
2002 Co-Steel Canada/US EAF/R/TSC M/JV 
2004 North Star United States EAF/R A 
2005 Diaco Colombia EAF/R A 
2006 
Sidenor Spain EAF/R A 
GSB Spain EAF/R A 
Sheffield United States EAF/R A 
PCS/Bay Area United States EAF JV/A 
Siderperú Peru BF/BOF/EAFR A 
2007 
Chaparral United States EAF/R A 
Sizuca Venezuela EAF/RL A 
INCA Dominican Republic R JV 
Sidertul Mexico BF/BOF/R A 
2008 SJK Steel India BOF/R JV 
 Corsa Mexico EAF/R A 
 Estructurales Mexico EAF/R JV/G 
 CCAA Guatemala EAF/R A 
 MacSteel United States EAF/R A 
2010 Tamco United States EAF/R A 
Abbreviations: 
Technological route: BF-Blast furnace; BOF-Basic oxygen furnace; EAF-Electric arc furnace; R-Rolling; TSC-
Thin slab caster Forms of investment: A-Acquisition; G-Greenfield; JV-Joint venture; M-Merger. 
Sources: Gerdau 2001, 2001a-2010a, 2001b-2010b; compiled by the author 
After a half decade of rapid growth in North America, the group started to seek other continents 
and other markets. In 2006, it gradually acquired the biggest special steel producer in Spain, 
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Sidenor, enabling its entry into the European market. The Group dominated the special steel 
market share in Brazil by acquiring Sidenor’s assets. In 2007, the group started operating in 
India, through a joint venture process (Lannes 2014, 158). 
The 2008 global economic crisis put a brake on the group’s expansion, when the group were 
the 13th largest steel enterprise in the world (Table 3). The reduction in sales revenues and the 
reduction in the return on investment would lead not only to a reduction in investment, but also 
an increase in disinvestment. 
Table 3. The biggest world steel producers, in million metric tons, 2008 
ArcellorMittal Nippon Steel Baosteel Posco Hebei Steel JFE Wuhan Steel 







Nucor Gerdau Severstal 
24.4 23.3 23.2 21.8 20.4 20.4 19.2 
Source: (World Steel Association 2017) 
In nearly three decades of internationalization by FDI, its production grew seventeen times 
over, reaching the level of 19 million tons in 2008. (It has stagnated ever since). In 2009, the 
net sales decreased 37%, at current prices, and only would resume its former level a half decade 
later. It would do so by a decelerating rate, so that the sales would decrease again in 2016. 
Meanwhile, direct sales costs increased more than sales values, decreasing the profit gross 
margin, thus threatening the group performance. With values above 25% from 2000 to 2008, 
such margin decreased quickly since the crisis, reaching 9.2% in 2016, pushing down the net 
profit margin to nearly zero. Net profit margins went from 10% in 2000-2008 to 0.1% in 2016, 
not accounting for the cost of impairment of assets, since it put a consolidated loss to the group 
in 2015 and 2016. The return on investment, measured by the return on equity, dropped from 
40.1% in 2006 to 4.6% three years later and -19.1% in 2015. Steady growth was threatened by 
this new economic scenario and in 2015 the group announced the 2022 Gerdau Project, whose 
main objectives were to simplify internal processes and structures, to modernize the group’s 
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culture, to reevaluate the performance of all its assets and to develop new business 
opportunities. This was the remedy against the crisis, whose cycle was not over yet. By 
reevaluating its assets, in 2016 the group began a process of equity reduction, selling Sidenor 
in Spain, corporate interests in Guatemala and Honduras, mineral coals operations and deposits, 
in addition to one steel factory in Colombia and some mill factories in United States (Gerdau 
2000a-2016a; 2015c, 9; 2016c, 37). 
In 2017, the group announced the separation between capital property and management (Gerdau 
2017). The fifth familiar generation would retire from the executive tasks on the board of 
directors, concentrating its effort on the administrative board. The new executives of the board 
of directors were coached in-house, who were trained within the group entrepreneurial culture, 
which allowed and would allow the appearance of inner management services necessary to 
grow. 
Final comments 
Despite the recent crisis, the Gerdau steel group has had a history of the growth since the 
acquisition of the first factory in February 1948. The production of long steel was the 
company’s specialization area and its core business. It grew by horizontal integration for three 
decades, based on acquisitions, after which vertical integration started, when it needed new raw 
materials and markets. 
After five decades of growing at a yearly rate of 11% when the local market grew at only three 
percent, the potential for growth resided in exporting to foreign markets and FDI (Hypothesis 
2). The Group’s internationalization effort accelerated in the first decade of the XXI century 
after nearly two decades of gathering know-how through foreign acquisitions. This endeavor 
was rewarded with increased market shares in both the United States and Latin America. Even 
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though the Group has merged and engaged in joint ventures a number of times, most of its 
growth is mainly attributed to acquisitions, revealing the importance given by this family group 
to maintaining total control of its capital management. Since the nineties, the group has added 
special steel and flat steel to its specialization area. The former has enabled them to ingress the 
international market and the latter the domestic market. Whereas the technological base was 
little impacted by the implementation of special steel production, it was the flat steel production 
that completely changed the productive base. It was the implementation of integral steel 
production that would increase its verticalization. Despite its accelerated diversification to other 
specialization areas, the original area still maintained 70% of the group productive capacity 
(Gerdau 2016b, 49) (Hypothesis 1). 
To each step in the growth strategy corresponded a necessary change in the administrative 
structure and values. The company shifted from functional to multidivisional structure, 
exercising a global system of control that would allow more decentralized decision making, 
resulting recently in the family decision to depart from positions in direct management. The 
group strategy to incorporate distinct management systems from acquired firms contributed to 
the separation of capital property and management which allowed distinct mandatory grades to 
subsidiaries, monitored by the global system of control. Furthermore, the firm’s values were 
upgraded, despite the fact of contradictions with workforce (Hypothesis 3). 
The group expansion into the global steel market was possible because of internal cumulative 
competitive advantage created in the process. Some of these advantages seemed to be the source 
of operational and financial management competitiveness. The first allowed for the creation of 
operational know-how expertise in the original steel specialization area, manly in process 
procedure. The latter allowed for access to alternative sources of funds, that is, the group went 
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from utilizing the financial system to being in the stock exchange market. Such advantages are 
idiosyncratically built, rare and imperfectly replicated, the ownership specific asset and 
externally transferable FSA (Hypothesis 4). 
Since long steel is a product with low possibilities of differentiation, the firm sought markets 
to increase production scale. In some situations, it did seek natural resources, withdrawing from 
those markets when the expected results were not produced. Colombia was one of those 
markets. In United States, it sought support and specific assets. Spain included seeking specific 
assets, but it was later discarded. Some assets located in Peru and in Argentina helped improve 
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